Adorno, the Frankfurt School and the Soul of Europe

No one who has read Theodore Adorno would have been surprised by last summer’s Charlie Hebdo cartoon when Amatrice, an Italian town otherwise known for its pasta sauce, suffered a fatal earthquake. The French magazine with its satirical pasta shapes covered with blood and sticking plaster suggested we consume disasters like we consume spaghetti. That’s exactly what Adorno meant by the Culture Industry: getting things in the wrong moral register, for lack of a spiritual norm to refer to.

charlie-hebdo-amatrice

In the last fifty years an easy way to refer to Adorno’s attacks on capitalism has been to evoke, more generally, the Frankfurt School. When the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research was set up in 1923, sociology taking over from philosophy as the leading humanities discipline after the disastrous First World War and the collapse of the German Empire, Adorno was on board. His friend and collaborator Max Horkheimer was briefly director from 1930 until both were forced to emigrate. Adorno and Horkheimer became famous in their US exile, and subsequently in Britain, as the authors of Dialectic of Enlightenment, which, first-time round, in German, they wrote in 1944 and quietly published in 1947. In it there they hammered away at the American commercial culture they found so shocking, after high-minded pre-war Germany. But their other target was totalitarianism, Hitler’s dictatorship.  They linked both these undesirable phenomena, one shallow, the other evil, with uses of reason, and technology, that exploited people’s souls, for want of a better word, rather than respected them. Of course that link has remained controversial.

I’d like to explain where it came from. The Frankfurt School didn’t depend on classical Marxism for its reasoning, but it was nevertheless deeply affected by Marx and Hegel. It used the high culture of German Idealism, and the dialectic of Hegel and Marx, and the Freudian unconscious, to try to unseat twentieth-century positivism, and what it saw as the capitalist attack on individual discrimination. By positivism I mean an excessive dependence on narrow rationality to define human truths. Individual discrimination meanwhile was the worry that capitalism put too many deceptions and obstacles in the way of the experiencing subject for anyone to be sure their knowledge of the world was true. Herbert Marcuse, one of the later Frankfurt school teachers, for instance worried that the recording industry obscures the true experience of music. But then what is that ‘true’ experience? Of course you can feel the old power of Idealist metaphysics here, surfacing to try deal with the sudden acceleration of technological progress in the twentieth century. For the German Idealists, Kant to Hegel, what we are is what we know, and perhaps even more important, how we know it; moreover how we know the world has a moral component. For its appreciative critics as for its detractors, this German epistemology – the extraordinary Idealist science of knowledge – was the last of the grand marriages between philosophy and Christianity that were perpetuated the Continental rationalist tradition. It was Idealism, still a set of metaphysical beliefs, that confirmed for the Frankfurt School that there was a truth of experience worth worrying about. They suspected capitalism was a conspiracy against that truth, in order to make money.

Cruder than the Frankfurt School, but the same message

Cruder than the Frankfurt School, but the same message

Attacking commercialism in the Frankfurt-School spirit

Attacking commercialism in the Frankfurt-School spirit

 

Adorno espoused a Marxism that suited this outlook but which was neither Moscow-inspired nor particularly concerned with the working-class.  I’ll say it again. He minded capitalism’s intrusion into the quality of our experience. I’ve always found that claim plausible. Think of it as philosophy’s equivalent of protesting that a huge ugly building ruins your view of nature, or unavoidable aural pap wipes out the Beethoven in your head. Both Horkheimer and Adorno felt the West needed rescuing from this terrible eclipse of integrity from culture. What people do now is flee to their chosen wildernesses, leaving the city, which they also love, and love to hate, to sort itself out. But Adorno and Horkheimer, with a touch of doomsday passion brought on by the excesses of the Hitler age, and the shock of their exile in the US, felt that individuals, and society, needed more guidance in the form of philosophical-sociological critique.

Their colleague the Freudian social critic Erich Fromm meanwhile wondered whether love itself had not become commodified in the twentieth-century rush to homogenize human feeling and sell it back to a mass market as a standard product. As a variation on the theme, two other great German-Jewish thinkers of the period, Marcuse, and the post-Freudian Wilhelm Reich who was not strictly of the Frankfurt School but related to them through his interest, like Fromm’s, imagined sexual liberation might liberate us from consumerist uniformity. Marcuse envisaged a critical society running free, enjoying by choice the high art of the past and unhibited free love. While Reich as an alternative German therapist in exile was persecuted by the US authorities, Marcuse as a university professor in California became the guru of radical counter-culture in the 1960s.

Wilhelm Reich under arrest. He died in prison in 1957.

Wilhelm Reich under arrest. He died in prison in 1957.

The Frankfurt School, better-known in the US than in Britain, has since been famously blamed, in large part, for ‘the closing of the American mind’. What a coup that was, to sideline, in the 1980s, the only force that would have sustained an American Left capable of taking on the big corporations in spiritual terms; capable of asking, what are you doing turning the mass of Americans into Nietzschean herd-people! It happened in Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind (1987), and in its wake subsequent generations of American intellectuals were quite at home with consumerism, and even imagined they could turn it into a moral project in itself. The journalist David Brooks gave the cultural appeasers a name: they were the bohemian bourgeoisie, a new bourgeoisie for the 1990s, intellectuals who liked shopping.  Derek Jameson, who remained devoted to Continental Philosophy, and its awkward critique of capitalism, was a rare exception.

What came to Britain from the Frankfurt School was not so much liberation  – we were liberated but not from this source and this form —  but Critical Theory.  Critical Theory hit British shores in the 1960s as a faint and quickly rejected influence on the New Left. The cultural materialism of Raymond Williams was a kind of parallel, and a shadow, born of a world more concerned with a defence of the working class, antipathetic towards the British Establishment and worried about –end-of-Empire. Art critic John Berger’s take on Walter Benjamin meant that Critical Theory would cause faint waves in obscure corners of art history. But in a recent book, Grand Hotel Abyss The Lives of the Frankfurt School (Verso, 2016), journalist Stuart Jeffries found that the Frankfurt School never really put down roots of influence, and that no one really cares today.  grand-hotel-abyss

The Frankfurt School were accused of being philosophical tourists in the disaster zone that 1930s Europe became. And yet it seems to me that these ‘philosophical tourists’ have many merits which would allow them to be rescued. Today for instance they are a way to understand why and how Europe, intellectual Europe, differs in its traditions from the British, and not only as a result of that tired explanation, its different experience of the twentieth century at war. The difference between Europe and Britain is something many of us want to ponder, as we have an isolationist and mercantile Brexit thrust upon us. What is striking to me is that Brexit is entirely lacking in moral imagination.

In the beginning two German-Jewish generations clashed to produce a furious reaction against material affluence. The late nineteenth-century fathers were businessmen who had got rich in the boom that followed German unification. Adorno’s father was in the wine trade; Horkheimer (who struggled far more with the paternal inheritance) was the son of a textile-factory owner. Their friend the critical writer and philosopher Walter Benjamin was born to a Berlin banker and antiques dealer. The commercial fathers defined a new bourgeoisie, but now their sons were intellectuals who worried about spiritual displacement.

Every time I refer to the spirit or the soul, as a reasonable, educated inhabitant of the twenty-first century, and even more as a native of a down-to-earth materialist country like the UK, I feel have to explain myself. But I can, and I will. ‘Spiritual displacement’ for instance meant to the last, critical inheritors of Idealism in the 1920s and 1930s, that the power of new money and the might of industry was destroying their nineteenth-century cultural church and its philosophical underpinnings. They were losing what they loved, and humanity was dwindling, as would be exemplified, in their view, by the German people’s frightful seduction by Hitler. While they studied Marxism as a potential antidote, they never really found an answer as to how to stem the tide except to teach Critical Theory, a form of intellectual resistance through the creation of concepts that could name and shame capitalism’s manipulative devices. They were sociologists, after all. Later, ironically, by the likes of Bloom, they would be accused of trying to annihilate the old culture themselves.  bloom-american-mind

The Institute came into being in Frankfurt am Main in 1923 to ask why a German Communist Revolution had not succeeded. That was its greatest Marxist credential. As soon as Hitler came to power, the Nazis pounced on this explicitly Marxist and Jewish hotbed, with Horkheimer crossing the Atlantic in 1934 and Adorno following in 1938. Fromm and Marcuse rejoined them. Only Benjamin never made it, out of indecision, fear and misfortune, and ended up killing himself in the south of France rather than fall into the hands of the Nazis.

Horkheimer, always the more moderate and conservative of the two, had already been toning down the Marxist image in Germany, and now he and Adorno airbrushed the M-word from their texts, not to offend their hosts and sponsors at Columbia University in new York, where the Institute was accommodated away from home. Thus while Dialectic of Enlightenment was fiercely anti-commercial, it really ached with personal disappointment.  The authors’ furious and melancholy sally skewered the Kantian ethics and Hegelian Idealism that had let them down, and now, in their absence was misleading the German people. Philosophy seemed complicit in reducing the Germans to a passive nation enamoured of authority.  But yes, the personal disappointment also extended to the New World’s mass-cultural happy-go-lucky optimism. How could they find themselves a place there? As Hannah Arendt, another bemused German-Jewish exile in New York, observed: only a culture with a strong dash of pessimism can expect to be taken seriously. (Bloom, shame on him, would name this wonderful thinker as one of America’s worst cultural imports.)

Adorno and Horkheimer’s offensive against the German heritage deepened into a devastating attack on Reason, or the heritage of the Enlightenment, and this became the badge of their Cultural Theory. Reason was at fault because in the world-colonizing instrumental form it took it led to the domination of nature, and thus paved the way, despite Enlightenment’s emancipatory programme, for the industrial annihilation of human beings.

As I say, it still is puzzling to many, how Adorno and Horkheimer could refer, in the same breath as they condemned Hitler and Stalin, the Shoah and the Great Terror, to commercial totalitarianism in the US, all as an extension of the negative legacy of the Enlightenment. But in fact the equation was based on a horror of social comformity, wherever and in whatever form. To Horkeimer born in 1895, and Adorno in 1903, the new technologies of wireless and film, offshoots of the astonishing progress made by science in the fifty years surrounding their births, and the growth of mass spectacle, were a deep threat to individual discrimination. Their friend in the Frankfurt they left behind, the journalist Siegfried Kracauer, wrote a timely essay on ‘The Culture of Mass Ornament’, which also cut between the Tiller Girls Dance Troupe and the aesthetics of totalitarianism on show at the Berlin Olympic Games of 1936. How did people lose their resistance to mass manipulation? Did they ever have it? Hidden deep in the mindset of Adorno was a belief in the self-reliance of individual judgement, in fact a cornerstone of the Enlightement’s own faith in mankind. But instrumental reason had nevertheless betrayed the Enlightment and led the modern world astray.

In my view Critical Theory was always puzzling because it was an extremely attentuated form of the old Kantian Subjective Idealism it was attacking and mourning at the same time. By the time of his death Benjamin was so bereft at the loss of faith in Kantian reason he was looking to Judaism for a new anchor. Adorno meanwhile maintained his angry stance. (One of his later books was subtitled ‘Reflections out of a Damaged Life’).  If the surface response of Critical Theory was, as Stuart Jeffries says in his Grand Hotel Abyss, ‘I’m not playing along,’ the hurt went deeper.

Adorno and Horkheimer wrote extensively of the seductiveness of authority; of how willingly, on the German example, people gave up their freedom to discriminate and protest. And they did this because, implicitly, they felt that if the Kantian tradition in critical subjectivity had not failed, Hitler wouldn’t have happened. But mass seduction and authoritarianism were not problems exclusive to Germany. And so these high-minded Germans turned from attacking Nazism to attacking Hollywood, because they felt that only the old values of individual discrimination nourished by a knowledge of high art and true love created enough resistance to mass manipulation. Fromm wrote in The Art of Loving (1956) of how much the capacity for true unsentimental love, erotic, filial and communal, mattered to the spiritual integrity of a society.fromm

If the Germannesss of all this is so obscure to British minds – a topic which I return to over and over, whatever the writer or philosopher in question — perhaps what needs to be said, simply, is that it hinges on a morality of perception which was always closely related to theology. How must I know the world in order to be a good person? If it is ever to be practised it relies on voluntary abstention and avoidance of whatever gets in the way of the better vision for humanity. Anything else would be political repression.

And so we come back to liberal Europe today, its very liberality in crisis, but its staunch supporters insisting on that moral-theological choice despite mercantile pressures. It’s a Europe that long ago assimilated the better aspects of Marxism in its concern with working conditions and general welfare, and through its French contribution particularly has retained a wariness of US commercialism, and of the UK’s trade before culture economic tradition, otherwise known as the anglo-Saxon model. In this Europe, outstandingly in Germany, where British politicians visit and gasp, it’s also the case that high culture still matters, in a way that Adorno, in fact perhaps best-known today as a music critic, would recognize. Adorno, who wrote on Beethoven and Schubert, Stravinsky and Schoenberg, and himself studied with Alban Berg, was no rebel from a world in which his mother had been an opera singer and he might have been a concert pianist. High culture was his upbringing.

In 1949 Adorno returned to what had become West Germany. The Frankfurt School was reinstated in the city of its birth and he and Horkheimer were restored to positions of academic celebrity. But their attitudes didn’t change. Adorno pursued an extreme pessimism, returning in different forms again and again to what caused German Idealism to fail. He saw it as his duty to resist the scientific positivism which was at once Anglo-Saxon in its roots and dominant in the post-war West, and to favour an approach which took greater notice of what was non-rational and extraneous and didn’t fit the paradigms. Adorno argued that the prevalent style of science arose out of the form of society that made it happen, and that in the process, the way science functioned in a capitalist society, critical challenge to the status quo was blocked. The Marxist-style argument was not convincing, though once again the run-in with what science was after, and the (im)possibility of the true society making it happen, reached back to what Adorno never called, but clearly was, theology for a secular age.

I’m struck by how Stuart Jeffries summed up the value of the Frankfurt School just a year ago. ‘Art has become impossible thanks to the impoverishment that it sought to honour. Instead we are left with the easily consumable products of the culture industry …the spirit of utopia is expendable in the online industry for which, among others Steve Jobs, Mark Zuckerberg and Jeff Bezos are responsible, and which gives us more of the same, develops algorithms the better to chain us to our taste, and makes us desire our own domination…[It is] a customized culture, one that abolishes serendipity, makes a mockery of dignity and turns human liberation into a terrifying prospect…’

The difficulty for anyone on the Left is to go along with Adorno’s lament for a Western high culture that crumbled under pressure of greater liberty and equality, and then was entirely colonized by digitzed markets.  But the difficulty of seeing how new generations can possibly resist market domination of their private experience makes Jeffries wonder whether alongside the problem of physical evil, on which Marx built his case to protect the material wellbeing of the worker, there was not always also metaphysical evil to contend with. How to protect and nurture the human soul is a question almost never discussed today, because for a start you would have to believe in it. But you could meanwhile admire Adorno, who tried to restate a concern for the soul, and you could mourn the European ideal, of which the Frankfurt School was a building block.

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Derrida: A very short defence

The critic Terry Eagleton recently published a review in The Times Literary Supplement (9 June 2016) in which he noted the passing of poststructuralism as an event without mourners. This was my response with regard to his observations on Jacques Derrida, the philosopher-performer who was so vilified in British academic circles during his lifetime and was barely granted a gracious obituary when he died in 2004.

Jacques Derrida (1930-2004)

Jacques Derrida (1930-2004)

Eagleton made much of the connection between the 1968 student revolts in Paris and the way  Derrida’s deconstruction burst on to the literary-philosophical scene in an attempt finally to cripple the power of the traditional humanities, with their core belief in universal meaning and continuity. ‘Libertarian pessimism’, Eagleton labelled Derrida’s contribution, with hindsight, and that seemed to me just right to describe this much-maligned thinker’s engagement with the dwindling power of the Logos in the second half of the twentieth century.

But is the best context to understand Derrida really the last- gasp French Marxism that took to the streets of Paris in 1968? Derrida was never a Marxist and never saw eye-to-eye with the  leftist radicals like Julia Kristeva and Philippe Sollers grouped around the journal Tel Quel.

It’s only when we remember  that that last gasp include a sigh of misery on the part of the philosophers that the Soviet version of Communism had proved such a disappointment that we begin to get a handle on Derrida’s essentially anti-totalitarian position. He opposed any notion of fixed values and meanings that could be used as instruments of political and cultural repression, and this went for the great cultural goods in literature and art and music which he had in desperation to protest he loved as much as anyone else. He only wanted to announce, as a philosopher, that he saw the danger of false normalities and narrowings, even in the free world.

French culture is, or was, as everyone knows, dominated by philosophy, and where Marx was/is regarded preeminently as a philosopher, the endlessly repeated question was how totalitarianism happened, since, for his supporters at least, Marx was open-ended. Derrida was certainly part of that response, in tandem, for instance, with Paul Ricoeur, one of his shrewdest and most appreciative critics.

For those horrified where Marxism had ended up, Marx’s philosophical predecessor Hegel had to be tackled. This was a Hegel who with Kant could be regarded as the father of Continental Philosophy, but whose dialectic had led, as it seemed, to the wretched closed system of the East Bloc, and the attendant punishments there for anyone who stepped out of line.

G.W.F Hegel (1770-1831)

G.W.F Hegel (1770-1831)

Karl Marx (1818-1883)

Karl Marx (1818-1883)

Consider this parallel. After the Second World War Germany, West Germany as was, spent the next forty years trying to master its erroneous past, in a self-lacerating cultural process known as Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Something similar happened in French philosophy after the veneer of Soviet Communism was peeled away. The question arose: where did we go wrong, for our ideals of humanitarian progress to end in the Gulag?

Derrida’s self-deconstructing performances whereby the dominant ideas of a culture were rendered undecidable were not pointless in that intellectually damaged France, wondering about the Marxist-Leninism to which it had been committed for so long. Still less was Derrida’s method frivolous with regard to the other Europe, the East Bloc, which still was ideologically imprisoned world for most of his lifetime. Derrida knew real totalitarian conditions well through his Czech-born wife and his involvement in Czechoslovakia.

Nor was the affinity between Soviet totalitarianism and its Nazi equivalent ever far from Derrida’s mind. As a Jew he had been sent home from school in Nazi-occupied Algiers.

When the Jewish pied-noir arrived in mainland France he found he was marginal for different reasons, and that too must have been an incentive to want to undo establishment hierarchies that didn’t welcome in the stranger. For the provincial lad whose voice was too loud Freud was an obvious source of deconstruction. Heidegger was a second tool, for there were bourgeois norms, bound up with classical metaphysics, to be ridiculed too.

It was when Derrida became an industry that the humanities really began to suffer from the Derrida effect. Anyone who has ever sat through a lecture cum performance by a Derridean hanger-on will not be surprised or perturbed by post-structuralism’s demise.

But as one has to say in the case of so many thinkers, what follows in their name is not exactly their fault. Derrida was one man’s resistance to a twentieth-century Western fate. He pioneered a kind of intellectual slapstick and made sure he couldn’t be duplicated.

In fact, and this has to be a great irony, because it places centre-stage those who rejected him in Britain, Derrida’s libertarian spirit has quietly migrated to British philosophy without the historical baggage. I heard one philosopher recently use the word ‘normative’ thirty times in thirty minutes, presumably to tell us that norms are bad.

It’s true that the post-structuralist dislike of norms has helped the neo-liberal economy expand and the possibilities of a unifying culture shrink. But don’t blame that on Derrida! Blame it on the aforementioned neo-liberal type of philosopher-parrot with no sense of European history!

I’ve blogged here about Derrida before, and also written about him in my latest book, A Shoe Story Van Gogh, the Philosophers and the West.

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Tony Blair: Idealist, Liberal or just Confused?

Idealist....

Idealist….

...or liberal?

…or liberal?

People fell in love with Tony Blair when he was elected Labour Prime Minister in May 1997.  Ten years later they hated him. Parliament had been lied to over the Iraq war. There never were convincing reasons to believe Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had ‘weapons of mass destruction’ that could hit the UK in forty minutes.

Blair has tried to ignore his unpopularity. To the present day he persists in commenting on the British political scene. People aren’t interested and the media barely do their duty by a passé VIP. No other major public figure since King Edward VIII in 1936 has been so effectively ostracized,  astonishingly in Blair’s case by the people’s will alone.

In Edinburgh in 2006 I was staying in a hotel with Blair’s old public school Fettes visible from the window. No one on the hotel staff had a kind word for a man who might a few years earlier have helped to keep their rooms full. A biography published in 2016 continued to heap up the charges of mendacity, coupled with a feeling, if you were a Labour stalwart, that the heart of the party had been betrayed. The writer Robert Harris, once a friend, was so incensed that in 2008 he published a novel, The Ghost, in which Blair’s fictional double, a corrupt socialite hiding behind an international reputation for goodwill, met a violent end. The evidence that since leaving office the once socialist Blair has also made a great deal of money out of his worldwide political celebrity has finally trashed his reputation as a decent man.

No doubt he feels hurt. No doubt his wealth is some compensation.

I never voted for him because I couldn’t bear his populism. Who respects a prime minister who only ever listens to pop music? Besides, I’m a Europhile ‘wet’ Tory, with a Green conscience, stuck in the very era, the early 1990s, that Blair surpassed. (The ‘wets’ were the gentler Conservatives sacked by Margaret Thatcher.)

So this isn’t a political defence or even a personal one. It’s just a way of opening up the question. Mendacity is a strong charge. But even in those more kindly disposed to Blair, or even impartial, there is a feeling of a strange incompatibility of ideas in his then outlook. Former Tory ‘Wet’, last Commissioner of Hong Kong and presently Chancellor of the University of Oxford Chris Patten observed, while reviewing a biography of  Henry Kissinger, that the American statesman whose foreign policy views dominated the Cold War wasn’t the pragmatist the world took him for. Often he was guided by ideals. He asked, in passing, was not some similar confusion at stake over Tony Blair? ‘As Tony Blair’s career demonstrated, it is even possible, if confusing, sometimes to be motivated by both sentiments at the same time.’[1]

To that one might say that a whole era was confused, and to glance at Blair’s career is to see it plainly.

It’s problematic to bring in the word ‘liberal’ but it can’t be avoided. It belonged to the age: of Clinton in the US and Blair in the UK, in a world morally uplifted by the demise of Soviet Communism.  The London-based magazine of ideas Prospect was one of its chief mouthpieces.

Just to take an example from domestic politics first. In 2008 the then head of the Demos thinktank Richard Reeves stretched the definition of ‘liberal’ to a new degree of elasticity by suggesting liberals should interfere in problem families and promote ‘good character’ but not oppose the government’s support for casinos. (Prospect August 31 2008)

Wasn’t there, isn’t there, some terrible confusion here?

What these two arguments have in common is that they are both utilitarian. In the first case, society needs protection from minority antisocial elements. Treating them as the victims of their social circumstances hasn’t worked. The state is left with no option but to intervene, whatever that entails. In the second, the utilitarian argument is applied to the freedom of business to make what profit it can from what a socialist would see as the weakness or vulnerability of certain sections of the population, but what a right-liberal would simply see as offering choice. Neither of these arguments seems particularly appealing to me, taken singly, but fudged together and called liberal they become a source of real pain. They further show how by the mid-2000s the word liberal had become almost meaningless in British discourse, except as a kind of password among like-minded friends. Those ‘liberals’ didn’t want to be bossy, but they also didn’t want society to fall apart. (A whole book could be written on how ‘rules’ were made, to look tough, but not implemented, not to hassle anyone, in the Blair era.) The same ‘liberals’ had a social conscience, but with socialism so deeply out of fashion they didn’t dare oppose themselves to the market.

The period up to the financial crash of 2008 looks to have been marked by a distinct bifurcation of the word liberal. There were left-liberals whose platform was social equality and right-liberals who talked about freedom and democracy but mainly proclaimed the freedom to spend money. Then there were the fudge-it liberals, call them proponents of The Third Way, who held both views at the same time.

All this might have been merely irritating if the test of whatever liberalism was hadn’t come with the Iraq War. To intervene in a problem country, or not? To be seen to be doing so on moral grounds while taking a casino-style punt on making a financial profit, or not?

One conclusion about Tony Blair might be that he thought he was a liberal, and the definition as managed by his friends and intellectual sympathizers was so elastic he was fully justified in his self-assessment. It meant he could do anything in the name of freedom and democracy, just like his US counterpart George W. Bush.

But there’s something else.

Here is one of my favourite stories in the history of ideas. A century ago there was a British philosopher who spent his entire life trying to work out what made people moral. At the end of his span he discovered the answer was that nothing necessarily did. No rational or emotional argument sufficed. He hesitated whether to incorporate this conclusion in his life’s work, and decided not to. The fragility of morality was not something, even if true, that he wanted to make public.

Did the great Victorian moral philosopher Henry Sidgewick do the right thing?

Henry Sidgwick 1838-1900

Henry Sidgwick 1838-1900

Bernard Williams, the greatest moral liberal in British philosophy of the twentieth century, was scathing. Henry Sidgwick, he said, had a’Government House’ mentality which was itself mendacious, because it placed ‘moral truth’ in the hands of the few, and held back the actual ‘truth’ from the many. It was a kind of imperialism of the mind, suited to a heirarchical, unequal country. It meant esoteric knowledge for the initiated and exoteric pap for the plebs.

Bernard Williams 1929-2003

Bernard Williams 1929-2003

But Williams’ contemporary Alasdair MacIntyre, a lifelong Communist and latter-day Communitarian, found that Sidgewick’s failure to find a fundamental source in human nature for morality was a tragedy.

Alasdair MacIntyre

Alasdair MacIntyre

If Williams was a liberal, and MacIntyre an idealist, whose side would you have been on? There was something definitive about these positions.

And yet in each case there was more to say about them. For Williams’s liberalism rested on a mixture of uncertainty and hope as to how human beings could arrange their affairs in a spirit of mutual tolerance, openness and non-interference, while MacIntyre, who had recently exchanged his Marxism for Roman Catholicism, believed in a guiding idea to shape the communal life. The fact that these positions appear to be irreconcilable opposites, and yet both aspire to a left-wing politics, may help us understand how confusion over what was liberal was put to the test of war in 2003.

The factor present in the Blair era but which went unspoken was MacIntyre-ish idealism. Idealist is just as unserviceable a word as liberal. But let’s say idealists are people who have a certain idea of what they want society to be like. Idea in the sense of an ideal pattern they’ve dreamed up in their heads, usually conforming to a vision of reason or of the good life. Idealists, said Patten, are ‘those whose ideals shape and infuse their actions.’ In these senses idealism contains a strong element of social construction, quite likes rules and is generally opposed to deregulation and laissez-faire. It’s a mentality that can come from the left – old-style socialism was idealist in this sense, or from the old-style paternalist right. But what idealism is not is liberal, neither economically nor socially.

What would you say? That Tony Blair went to war in Iraq because of a moral idea? I think so. Like a liberal government intervening in problem families for the sake of promoting good character, there he was, eventually allowing Saddam’s head to be used as a football, in the name of freedom and democracy. Unfortunately the idea was in its first assumption of justified interventionism shaky. Also the moral content it supposed itself to be carrying was empty. Deregulation and laissez-faire couldn’t give any guidance on how to live. They just made money for the post-war invasion of foreign contractors seeking a profit from rebuilding.

Freedom was another awkward word, and behind it lurked exactly the liberal/idealist dichotomy that in my view characterized the Blair era unbeknown to it. Negative freedom is leaving people to do their own thing. That is liberal. That is a la Bernard Williams and Isaiah Berlin. Positive freedom is putting ideals out there and encouraging others to aspire to them. That is idealist. That is MacIntyre. And yet it was the liberals in Blair’s sense who were interventionist in foreign policy, and yet in the name of an ideal.

In fact this same tension between letting people get on with their own lives and giving them an idea how to go about it lies at the heart of Britain’s current problems with Europe, and Europe’s own with the so-called anglo-saxon market model. The French ideal for two centuries has been to build society on certain secular, rationally determined principles. That rationalism includes a vision of how humanity ought to be, and unchecked liberalism puts a strain on the vision. The same is true of contemporary Germany. It’s why Chancellor Angela Merkel, nominally on the political right, seems to belong in British terms to the caring left. The EU is the ultimate moral-political idea of her time, and Francois Hollande’s. Brits are encouraged to think about whether to stay in or leave the EU purely in selfish economic terms, but the result of the June 23 2016 referendum will also be about their intellectual and moral future.

So it wasn’t just a confusion of the Blair era. In British domestic politics the liberal/idealist distinction – at least as I’ve set it out here – continues to polarize all of us. Economic liberals love choice. Idealists hate it as the supreme evasion of government and market responsibility. Idealists like the Welfare State. Liberals don’t, to judge by those militant Americans, incomprehensible in Europe, who blocked President Obama’s Health Care bill. Education equally tears us apart. On Grammar Schools, say, what once seemed an instrument of the good life stopped serving its purpose and academies were introduced, but they are suspected of being half a government Idea and half a market opportunity. Idealists on the left in education keep searching for a new political Idea acceptable to them ie. non-selective, and refuse to leave the market to sort things out. But they, the teachers, very often exercise a conservative effect.

New Labour, Blair’s party, rose and fell on the strength of getting rid of its idealism, the old Labour idea of defending the workers against the market.

Blair rose and fell because he was an idealist who thought he was a liberal. I wonder what he calls himself now?

For myself I’ll settle for idealist.

[1] Niall Furguson Kissinger: 1923-1968: The Idealist reviewed in the Financial Times Sept 18, 2015

 

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Shakespeare and Wagner or Turning the Bard Inward

What is it links Shakespeare and Wagner?

shakespeare image wagner

Almost a hundred years ago Edgar Istel  examined how Wagner borrowed from Measure for Measure to create his early opera Das Liebesverbot (The Ban on Love)and set out how Wagner read Shakespeare and returned to him throughout his life. [1]  But the real Wagner/Shakespeare story it seems to me is much more interesting than a conventional historical approach can reveal. Essentially it takes us through two ages of philosophy. We need to compare a certain overlap between Descartes and Shakespeare, and another, three hundred years later, between Husserl and Wagner. It will help us see exactly what Wagner was doing with his Shakespeare.

Descartes (1596-1650) would have been six when Hamlet was first performed in London, and he never referred to Shakespeare. The Bard is much more often compared with the sceptical Montaigne (1533-1592) But when the philosopher Bernard Williams called Descartes ‘the soliloquizer of The Meditations’ he was not wrong, for Hamlet was full of  cognitive doubt. [2] In that 1641 text Descartes dared challenge God and the moral order by asking a set of forensic questions. Like the character Hamlet Descartes opened up a new universe of subjectivity which risked being godless.

With Hamlet Shakespeare was interested in how a world including England was poised to change with Luther’s Protestantism.  In Wittenberg Martin Luther, professor of theology from 1508, had nailed his decrees of protest against Rome to the church door in 1517. At The Diet of Worms in 1521 the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V outlawed him as a heretic. Both of these signifiers became key functions in the 1610 play: Wittenberg played a role right from the first two scenes of Act I and the Diet of Worms was a joke in Act IV scene iii, closely followed by ‘The present death of Hamlet. Do it England…’

Luther and Descartes agreed, more or less, that only the individual can say whether the experience in our heads corresponds to what is actually real and true of whatever world we are part of. Luther’s Christianity eschewed the authority of the Church in favour of  personal faith alone: fide sola.

In Shakespeare’s play Hamlet was shown to be the instrument of the new Wittenberg inwardness.  It had turned him into an acute agent of moral conscience/consciousness, with his ‘globe’ ‘distracted’ (I:v). He spoke ‘I’ in a new way.  Moreover, because of his emotional character, and what had happened in his life, he was about to show how the new faith, with its insufficient guarantees of certainty, could drive a susceptible man to madness.

Now we can follow Hamlet’s torment from outside, as a study in subjectivity, and as a dramatic reflection of the Cartesian doubt, which the Romantics did.

But as a twentieth-century critic suggested around fifty years ago now, under a different kind of philosophical guidance we can also immerse ourselves in Hamlet’s consciousness, and perhaps have a rather different philosophical-artistic experience. ‘It is no longer a question of pretending that Hamlet is real so that we may become interested in his adventures. Instead we make ourselves present to Hamlet’s world so that it may touch us and flow into us. Feeling has depth…and does not proceed without fervour…There is even love…the expectation of a conversion by the attention we pay to the other…in the aesthetic attitude.’ [3]

 

 

It is the phenomenological approach to Hamlet, I want to suggest, is what helps us see the Shakespeare-Wagner relationship in a new light.

With his phenomenology Husserl took the Cartesian cogito – the I think, I am – in a new direction by asking not what it was to know, but what it was to be conscious. When  the mind is awake, even semi-awake, it has thoughts, and fantasies, references to past, future and nowhere and never, which all get drawn into the experience of now. Intentionality is what Husserl calls everything filling our consciousness at one moment; and what he wants to pin down is all the wishing and hoping and fearing and promising and speculating and fantasizing and regretting that engulf us. Husserl’s phenomenology is about what grammar calls the subjunctive mood.  Wagner set that to music.

In fact Husserl thought that his work was like that of Hugo von Hofmannsthal, an extraordinary lyric poet and one of Wagner’s immediate operatic successors, but the parallel with Wagner works much more powerfully.  Wagner himself once brilliantly defined his approach: ‘As the drama does not describe human personages but lets them present themselves directly, music in its motifs immediately brings before us the character of world-phenomena in their most intimate seity. The movement, configuration and variation of these motifs are…not simply related to the drama, but the drama presenting the idea can in reality only fully be comprehended through the movements, shapes and changes of these motifs of the music…Hence if we gather together the complex of the cosmos of Shakespeare’s shapes…and compare it with the cosmos of Beethoven’s motifs…one must become aware that the one microcosm is fully the equivalent of the other…’[4]

Wagner admired Shakespeare’s grandeur and range. He paid him the ultimate compliment of calling him ‘The Second Creator’.

 

But where the composer’s originality began he became Shakespeare’s rival. He made two crucial autobiographical statements which show the path he took. The first was that  he actually became a composer  to equal Shakespeare. The second, intricately related to the first, was that Shakespeare originated the music-drama.

In truth Wagner wanted to be Shakespeare. He summed up why late in his life: ‘Shakespeare, the great mimetic talent, could not fulfil all the roles he created. The composer, however, may realise all aspects of music and may be at one with the executant musician.’[5]

And so he drew Shakespeare’s world of epic grandeur and Hamletian interiority into his own religion of art, where he transformed it. Consider only the leitmotiv by which he approached his Shakespearean-style  heroes and heroines, warriors and lovers, from inside their emotions, and represented those interiorities of longing, loving, hating, promising with a new musico-dramatic device. The leitmotiv has been described as ‘an all-embracing amalgam of sound, feeling and experience, the little phrase is a single unified thing, in ordinary terms “a moment in time”.’ [6]

 

One of his biographers has suggested the ‘Total Work of Art’, Wagner’s ideal of the Gesamtkunstwerk, was simply a formula to use all of Wagner’s talents.[7] But I suggest rather it was a homage to Shakespeare, stoked by Wagner’s desire for his audience to submit to a rival total experience.

Meanwhile the philosophers we have referred to make it clear that Wagner was striving to convey consciousness, not subjectivity, and that was what made him post-Romantic and Early Modernist, if we want to stick even more labels on his achievement.

Notes

[1] Margaret Inwood The Influence of Shakespeare on Richard Wagner (1999).

[2] Bernard Williams Descartes The Project of Pure Enquiry (1978,1990) 68.

[3] Mikel Dufrenne The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (1953) tr. Edward S. Casey (1973) 405-406.

[4] Edgar Istel Wagner and Shakespeare (1922)

[5] Roger Paulin The Critical Reception of Shakespeare in Germany 1682-1914 (2003), 429.

[6] Malcolm Bowie Proust Among the Stars (1988) 109

[7] Brian Magee Aspects of Wagner (1968) 84

(The above a shortened version of a talk given to Kingston University Shakespeare Seminar on Jan 8, 2015.)

 

Posted in english literature, German Literature, Music, Philosophy and Philosophers, Theatre, Things German | Tagged , , , , , , , ,

Iris Murdoch on the Easter Rising 1916

The Red and the Green was Iris Murdoch’s seventh novel and stood out in her fictional career as a unique attempt to capture an historical event. The topic was The Easter Rising, Dublin 1916, in which independence fighters staged an abortive attempt to defeat the island’s British rulers. Home Rule was anyway in the offing, and six years later a free Ireland was born.

Iris Murdoch 1919-1999

Iris Murdoch 1919-1999

Murdoch was interested in two things: an era of heroism and accounting for her own departure from Ireland and Irishness. Born into an Anglo-Irish family in Dublin in 1919 she, like Frances in the novel, left to make her adult life in England and never returned. But in a coda to the novel’s main action she had Frances more than two decades on weep at the memory of good men; and especially at the memory of rebel leader Pat Dumay, whom she had secretly loved. When she wrote the novel in 1965, as if for the half-centenary of the Easter Rising the following year, Murdoch wished, through Frances, that the feelings surrounding the Dublin men’s self-sacrifice for their country shouldn’t be forgotten. Again through Frances she compared it to the moral debacle of the Spanish Civil War. National feeling was also a mystical element in the novel.

Murdoch in England felt with her characters on both sides of the divide and all around it. The mystique of old times and of the fighting spirit of oppressed small nations was something Frances’s English husband, decent, kind, an Establishment figure, could not appreciate. Frances too chose England, yet loved Pat.

None of her novels before or after reflected quite such a battlefield of loyalties, in one city and two closely linked families. Moreover they were loyalties that went to the heart of her growing body of work as a writer and philosopher. She was interested in moral feelings; in the dialogues people had internally with themselves over the right thing to do; in feelings of love avowed and hidden, known and unconscious. Interwoven through the whole was the role religious faith played in those feelings, or not. ‘Muddle,’ was a repeated word. Perhaps it was the case that you couldn’t have heroism without muddle. That in turn left Murdoch, a philosopher, in some professional difficulty. Another repeated, spurned idea in the novel was ‘logic’. Logic never helped anyone work out what to do.

The descriptions of Dublin were rich and evocative, the dialogue sharp, and the characters among the most convincing she ever created. This was Murdoch at her nineteenth-century realist best, with only a hint, at the end, of the kind of Dostoevskian Gothic that would turn too much of her fiction into arch melodrama.

ireland in the rain

In fact Pat Dumay did not particularly stand out as lovable among the brilliant interweave of English, Irish and Anglo-Irish characters. But he was noble. What was said in the novel of the historical figure of Roger Casement, whom the British later hanged, applied to Pat.  ‘He’s a brave man and a patriot. He does it purely for love of Ireland. To love Ireland so much, to love anything so much, even if he’s wrong-headed, is somehow noble.’ Pat Dumay felt ‘the enormity of the insult laid upon his people.’ More intimately, he was a Lawrentian figure in his physicality, only with an un-Lawrence-like obsession with sexual purity. He loves none of the women in the book. One passing suggestion is he might prefer men. The scene when his fourteen-year-old brother Cathal prepares him a hot bath sticks in the memory as uniquely sensual. Their father long dead, Pat will guard Cathal with his life, in a relationship that is at once surrogate-paternal and erotic.

D.H. Lawrence

D.H. Lawrence

Roger Casement

Roger Casement

Cathal, precociously involved and desperate to fight, takes up themes often underplayed in historical accounts of the event. The rebels’ cause was overlaid with a sense that they were overthrowing the ruling class in the name of the international proletariat. One of their leaders, James Connolly, Cathal’s hero, was a follower of Lenin. Murdoch as a young woman had been a Communist sympathiser.

Like any novelist she couldn’t help setting out, early on, many of the themes that would recurr through her work. To moral muddle add sexual muddle and gender confusion, and remnants of mystical and religious feeling her characters don’t know what to do with. It is rightly said that though this novel was set in 1916 it was suffused with the sexual liberation of the early 1960s and with the questioning of traditional gender roles.

The author has a particular debate with herself in The Red and the Green over what kind of woman to be. Frances is bright and determined but remains demure. She embarks on a conventional marriage, with children, which turns out happy if slightly dull. Her opposite is Millie, a flamboyant aristocrat said to have been inspired by the historical figure of Constance Markievicz. Millie wears trousers and instals a shooting gallery in her home. Her animality – Murdoch uses the word – her prettiness and her charm repeatedly ravish men. To use another 1960s word, when such behaviour was still seen as unconventional and unacceptable, Millie was promiscuous in her favours and probably never really in love, except with the heroic, unreachable Pat Dumay. There are moments when Millie seems like a principal boy in an operetta, or a schoolgirl playing a man on stage. She’s pushing the boundaries of gender.

A young Iris Murdoch

A young Iris Murdoch

Another 1960s element was a strong whiff of existentialism: of defining oneself through action rather than, as long centuries of philosophy had insisted, through contemplation. Murdoch had written one of her most successful books on Jean-Paul Sartre’s ethos of political commitment.

Looking from outside, Murdoch herself was at least  two things. She was an English conservative Romantic, picking up postwar where the interwar Romantic modernists had led in painting and poetry. She loved landscape, light, sea, and was inclined to find there some metaphysical significance. She was also a liberated woman of androgynous appearance and inclination, leading a bisexual life that would force her to resign her Fellowship at St Annes College, Oxford. Her fiction fused mystical love with the discovery of the decade that casual sex could be fun.

In The Red and the Green a terrific, conflicted character called Barney has had to abandon his vocation as a priest because of his feelings for the ‘animal’ Millie. Ever after, even after having married the staid Kathleen and become an alcoholic figure of fun and pity, he hangs around Millie’s Dublin home. In fact this failed priest draws from Murdoch an extended outpouring of religious feeling, as he follows the progress of the Easter story. These feelings in turn segue into a mystical sense of ‘Ireland’. The English in Ireland don’t get it. ‘In Ireland religion was a matter of choosing between one appalling vulgarity and another,’ says Andrew Chase-White, who always hoped to marry Frances.  But Barney, even as he denounces the rebels as incapable of running the country, and the Irish church as  ‘mushy devotional nonsense’, always comes back to some national essence. ‘Ireland for him was a dark place, slow dignified and mystical.’

In Murdoch’s wonderful evocations, the weather has a great deal to do with Ireland’s distinctiveness. The rain in Ireland, she once said, had the same mystical import as snow in Russia.

History was the feeling of ‘a rhythm of a much larger scheme which has included us within its composition.’ (Chapter 12) Although here she sounded pedestrian, what attracted her, as a writer, was the moment of historical witness. ‘Of course the men had been told, from long ago, that they must be prepared for anything on any occasion when they marched out at arms. But they had marched out in arms so often and returned afterwards to their tea. There was a ferment in Dublin all the same …[which] was dangerous. It was still only Thursday.’ She didn’t quite capture that ferment, but she made the Easter Rising a stunning family affair in a haunting city.

In the Aftermath of the 1916 Rising

In the Aftermath of the 1916 Rising

Posted in english literature, Iris Murdoch, novels, Philosophy and Philosophers, Who are you? | Tagged , , , , , ,

Antonio Tabucchi’s novel of pessmism and measured hope set in Fascist Portugal

Antonio Tabucchi in 1988

Antonio Tabucchi in 1988

Pereira Maintains, by the late Italian writer Alexander Trocchi, is a minature masterpiece. It is as satisfying in its form as it is morally, and contemporary literature doesn’t offer so many chances to say this. A smash success in Italy after it was published in 1994, it came out in English soon after, in a smooth and elegant translation by Patrick Creagh. Reviewers were highly positive, albeit anxious to pigeonhole the book as ‘an intellectual thriller’.

It’s about how a man makes a moral decision which in this case is also a political decision. The setting is Portugal, where under the (never named) dictator Oliviera Salazar the climate has become increasingly thuggish as the Civil War rages in neighbouring Spain. Pereira, newly appointed editor of the cultural section of his newspaper, is concerned, like most of us, with his immediate needs. He needs to find new contributors, meanwhile his overweight body is suffering in the stifling weather. Somewhat compulsively this widower of some years now finds himself in a bar ordering one sweet lemonade after another, and eating cheese omelettes, while turning over the pages of some periodical lying around.

There he reads an article about death, and you might say that the process of his decision begins to unfold. Trocchi though writes with a light touch, and the moral architecture of the novel only becomes clear at the end.

The contributor of the article on death is a young man, recently graduated. Pereira contacts this Monteiro Rossi and asks him to write obituaries for his paper. None is publishable, because each deals openly and honestly with a recently deceased artistic figure caught up in Europe’s madness. Articles attacking the Mussolini supporter and Futurist poet Filippo Tomasso Marinetti as a fascist warmonger, and defending the art and honour of the dramatist Federico Garcia Lorca, recently murdered by the Nationalists in Spain, are unpublishable, but the increasingly weary Pereira finds himself so drawn to Rossi that he doesn’t object. He pays him anyway and when he meets Rossi’s attractive, politically outspoken girlfriend, there is a faint sense he is adopting Rossi as his son, and helping the couple make their way in life.

F.T. Marinetti (1876-1944). He also styled himself to look aggressive.

F.T. Marinetti (1876-1944). He also styled himself to look aggressive.

The relationship is put to the test when Rossi asks Pereira to hide a friend of his, a fugitive Spanish republican.  And then it is Rossi himself whom Pereira tries to hide, as the ununiformed and brutal political police get wind of his involvement with the anti-fascist activists.

At the beginning of the novel Pereira is reading classical French literature, and translating it for his feuilleton. He chooses stories of resistance and repentence which will cause no one offence though perhaps he might hope for their indirect influence on the present climate. Nevertheless the pressure from above comes soon enough, to pay more attention to Portuguese national poets and join the chauvinistic chorus of the Lisbon dictatorship. If Pereira is to resist then he must see that the classic intellectual resort to literature as only obliquely related to political events is not enough. (Remember that this novel was set around 1936, the year Lorca died.)

Federico Garcia Lorca

Federico Garcia Lorca

Is it this professional crisis, or is it the heat, that inclines Pereira to seek help from two parallel sources? One is his priest and the other is a kind of broad brush psychoanalysis dispensed by a sanitorium doctor who, after Pereira stays for a week, becomes his friend and confidante. It becomes clear in retrospect how these two help Pereira make his decision. The doctor talks about not one self but many selves, and how in a person it can happen that a long dominant version of the self can suddenly or gradually give way to another possible way of being. To the reader this seems to be happening to Pereira, as he confronts his suppressed fear of death. The witty and worldly priest discourages him from any political hesitation. He must know where his duty lies. Pereira himself has witnessed or heard of alarming stories of anti-semitism, revived every time he passes the local kosher butcher, and of murder. All the while he is in conversation with the photograph of his dead wife, a device which seems to combine the inevitability his own mortality with hints of the loneliness that makes him reach out to Rossi; and finally there is the sense of what his wife would have expected of him, as a good man, as he delivers his account of the days to her.

And so the violent climax of the novel unfolds which it would be a pity to reveal, for it is deftly handled and gripping. Out of it emerges a new, courageous and resolute Pereira who, having committed an act of irrevocable political suicide, quickly exits the country for exile in France.

It is possible, as some reviewers have suggested, that, since the narrative is punctuated every few sentences with the refrain ‘Pereira maintains’, Pereira has all along been giving an account of himself to his captors.

But essentially Pereira Maintains is a novel about how a man saves his soul. On my reading there can hardly be any doubt that a positive outcome is meant, and that it is an endorsement of Catholic faith. The standpoint is God’s, and the narrative turns out to be, retrospectively, what a man has to say about himself when he arrives at the gates of St Peter.

A wonderful fiction, like no other I’ve read for a long time. Tabucchi died in 2012.

Posted in Anyone's Game - my latest novel, Literature in Translation, novels, Who are you?, Writing | Tagged , , , ,

Victor Klemperer, the German-Jewish academic who chronicled everyday life in Hitler’s Germany

images

Victor Klemperer was a German-Jewish academic whose survival of the Hitler years made possible his unique and irreplaceable testimony. Through 1931-1945 he kept detailed diaries of daily life in Dresden. There were sketches of a few friends who became Nazi enthusiasts. Those he wouldn’t meet again. Some turned from Hitlerism to Communism, and Klemperer found them misguided. A few others, like himself and his wife Eva, quietly held out against the ideological pressures of the era. How did they manage it? Eva was Aryan, but even so. Both it seems survived by the skin of their teeth.

By 1934 the professor of Romance studies at the university of Dresden succumbed to raising his right arm in greeting and saying ‘Heil!’ to colleagues. But he swallowed the name of Hitler. He and Eva bravely voted ‘no’ in the August 1934 plebiscite when the Führer asked the German people to accept him as what he had already declared himself to be, Germany’s absolute leader. He would be Chancellor and President, now that the old and infirm outgoing President Hindenburg, for months reduced to a puppet figure, had finally died.

Victor was by the way a cousin of the famous classical music conductor Otto Klemperer, magnificent interpreter of Beethoven, who had already fled Nazi Germany. Victor, with his constant money worries and his deep attachment to his job and his way of life, stayed. His early diaries are full of political and personal worries as he comes more and more under Nazi pressure. From year to year they spell out in rapid succession how Victor loses his job and his right to use libraries. When the Klemperers are confined to a succession of ‘Jew Houses’ their story seems to demonstrate something of what Hannah Arendt meant when, in connection with the Nazi phenomenon, she wrote of  ‘the banality of evil’. As the days and years pass we watch how this once affluent bourgeois couple, who for much of the early diaries are building a house and motoring about in a new car, are forced into humiliating racial house arrest under a regime that despises them. It is a story that deserves dramatic treatment in its own right, not least because of its unradical, unheroic beginning in ordinary middle-class affluent life.

The Klemperers’ Nazi persecution ends dramatically the night the Allies bomb Dresden, one of Germany’s most beautiful and historic cities, southeast of Berlin. After this so-called Baedeker Raid (the Nazis had long been targeting historic city centres in England) Dresden burned all night. In the small hours the no longer young Klemperers became separated and thought the other one lost. Still they survived to live out the natural span of their lives.download

Dresden, where Klemperer was reinstated at the university postwar, was in eastern Germany, and so after 1945 their new country became the Communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). That’s why the diaries for so long remained unknown. All through the Communist years Klemperer’s 5,000 typed pages lay untouched in Dresden’s Saxony Regional Library (Sächsische Landesbibliothek). The collapse of Communism in the East Bloc late in 1989 finally gave historians access. A first edition of the 1933-45 diaries appeared in 1995, and a revised and annotated second edition in 1999. The material was so important that translations immediately followed. Klemperer’s companion study of the language of the Hitler years, Lingua Tertii Imperii, came out in English in 1997, and the abridged diaries edited by Martin Chalmers in 2000. The postwar diaries have since also appeared.

My topic here is only the first German volume of the diaries covering January to December 1933-34, and all the translations that follow are mine. I’ve been reading it to feel my way into the daily life of a German university academic with a liberal political disposition and a sharply critical mind, as he witnesses his country’s culture of the last century and a half crumble overnight. In his view, and no one would think he was exaggerating, his countrymen have become beasts. The very first word of the first entry, on Saturday 14 January 1933, leaps from the page. Rektorwahl, it says.  A new Rektor (the prominent representative position known in English universities as that of the Vice-Chancellor) is to be elected at Dresden University. It’s a stitch-up, Klemperer reckons, but not yet one that favours a Nazi candidate. For that the German universities will have to wait another two months, for Hitler’s full accession to power. But for anyone who knows the period it’s exactly what that word Rektorwahl unwittingly anticipates. The philosopher Ernst Cassirer, the first Jewish Rektor of a German university ever, was poised to be dismissed from his post in Hamburg and chased out of the country in April 1933. Meanwhile his great philosophical opponent Martin Heidegger would become Rektor in Freiburg am Breisgäu in May, joining the Nazi Party along the way. Heidegger would remain German, but at the price of never returning to the university to teach and being posthumously outlawed by the liberal world. Such were the fates of university professors in Germany. They either chose, and in Heidegger’s case made a colossal error,  or they had their position chosen for them, by their ethnicity.

It was in this climate that Klemperer kept a record of the daily press, and the gossip, and his wife’s troubled health, and the declining numbers of his students – on some days just two or three. The diaries are a gripping, if sometimes repetitive compilation of life stories, daily events and whatever this consummate intellectual is trying to find time to write and read. He was a passionate lover of the French eighteenth century. The climate of fear forces him to know who he is. On 9 July 1933 he writes: ‘For my part I can see ever more clearly what a useless creation of High Culture I am, unable to live in more primitive environments. [The names of friends and colleagues] can find their bread here and there and somehow reinvent themselves in the practical sphere. But I by contrast can’t even be a language teacher, I can only lecture in intellectual history, and only in the German language and in a wholly German way. I have to live here and die here.’

I want to know how that German High Culture collapsed, in detail, and how philosophy, and philosophers, were caught in the disaster. ‘Jews should write Hebrew, not German,’ says a poster Klemperer spots on the wall of the Student Building at the University (April 25, 1933). ‘When they write German they lie.’ In fact, as the Nazis would find to their irritation, the German culture they claimed as their own was being maintained through the brilliant expertise of German Jewish scholars in every field. In the forefront of philosophy and the higher journalism were Cassirer, for instance, and the even better known names of the philosopher Edmund Husserl, the philosopher, sociologist and musicologist Theodor Adorno, and the journalist and essayist Siegfried Krakauer. Walter Benjamin, with his essays on literature, and on the new media, his memoirs and his street pictures, was emerging as a German genius sui generis. Klemperer for his part is left staring at the poster on the wall. ‘I make a note of only the most brutal things, just fragments of madness, in which we are immersed over and over.’ Almost every day as he takes in the latest news he speculates whether Hitler’s power can last, for how long, and whether, as his neighbours think in ’33, the French might come to Germany’s rescue. It is a time of febrile uncertainty, in which, as if in times of greater normality, Eva, a talented concert pianist who has given up her career, is simply chronically ill with her nerves, and the childless couple with their two cats decide on a house-building project in the countryside which might help her pull through.

It’s in these times that Klemperer also turns his observations on his fellow Jews, and not always with sympathy.

15 September, 1933: ‘The position that Gerstle has taken up displeased me. He seems almost to have reconciled himself with the situation, at least he was divinely respectful, declaring Hitler a genius; he didn’t want to underestimate his opponent and considered the present state of affairs evidently by far not the worst of the awful states of affairs possible, etc.’ The same Gerstle offends again on 9 October, along with friend Blumenfeld who declares that ‘one can’t live off wish-dreams’ and ‘must keep one’s feet on the ground of facts.’ The wife of a third acquaintance, ‘ an eternal silly goose’, has been so taken in by the newspapers and the radio that she can only ‘parrot’ statements about the ‘system which had to collapse and has now been overcome.’ ‘Eva’s bitterness is even greater than mine,’ Klemperer notes. ‘National Socialism, she says, more precisely: the way the Jews are behaving towards it, is making her anti-semitic.’ For the Klemperers all Germans have a duty to hate Hitler (22.10.1933) and never for an hour to let that hatred sleep. A year later and Victor is furious this is not what is happening at all: ‘What I hate above all is the specific Jewish pessimism with its amiable self-certainty. [It’s the] ghetto mentality, freshly awoken. We get kicked, that’s how things are. If only we could get on with our business, and [if only] no pogrom comes. Better Hitler than someone worse! Recently an evening with Mrs Schnaps was awful in this way. And the Blumenfelds are in their element with it and think just the same.’  (30 December 1934)

Still, the problem is this monstrously irrational and murderous National Socialism. The Germans, with their great Kultur: how could they turn on the Jews like this? How could they fall prey to a regime of illiterates and a demented leader? One of Klemperer’s persistent themes is the general atmosphere surrounding Nazism, of dumming down coupled with a vicious anti-intellectualism and a campaign against higher education. Can culture, can spirit (Geist) ever fight back, he wonders at one point. As university students are diverted from learning into ideological campaign work and academic timetables are curtailed to make way for more ‘sport in the service of the Reich’ (9 October 1933 and 9 November 1933) he concludes that the Nazis, as they continue to defame the values of intellect and of higher education, count on the primitivism and the stupidity of people  (1 August 1934) to make a stupid insensitive Germany happen. His question, the question German historians would have to ask themselves for decades to come after Hitler’s defeat, is, already formulated on  14 July 1934: how can a European people do this? And the mass slaughter of the Jews is yet to come.

Another theme of the diary of the first two years is the similarity between Hitlerism, Soviet Communism, Italian Fascism and Zionism. Repeatedly Klemperer notes the similarities between totalitarian regimes. He is also no friend of Palestine, the future Israel, where friends are emigrating. ‘Anyone who goes there is exchanging nationalism and narrowness for nationalism and narrowness. It’s a land of immigration for capitalists. It’s said to be about the size of the province of East Prussia. Inhabitants: 200,000 Jews and 800,000 Arabs.’ (9 July 1933)

Since I’m trying to feel my way into the daily German life that was the backcloth to a huge upheaval in German philosophy, I can’t help noticing where Klemperer overlaps with thinkers in almost all camps. (Even Heidegger observed the stupidity of the Nazis which repelled him.) Klemperer is a liberal, but there is more to the German crisis than adhering to a recognized political position. There is for instance the day he sits down and starts reading Ernst Cassirer’s last published work in Germany, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, which will quietly echo his own consternation and misery that German culture, the creation of Goethe and Schiller and Kant and Lessing, came come to this. In a different vein his constant monitoring of the ideological misuse of the relatively new medium of the wireless, of the newspapers and of the propaganda machine that uses the techniques from marketing and advertising, has to remind us of Benjamin and Krakauer. Krakauer had been making similar observations in Frankfurt until he lost his job at the Frankfurter Zeitung after March 1933. A culture which couldn’t withstand ideological manipulation by a dictatorship was also the exact jumping-off point for Walter Benjamin’s 1936 essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility’. Adorno and Horkheimer had meanwhile been studying mass media and totalitarianism in both Germany and  America for years when they wrote, in 1944, their Dialectic of Enlightenment. Like Benjamin and Adorno and Horkheimer the refined and learned Victor Klemperer, who published books on Voltaire and Montesquieu and many other eighteenth-century French literary themes, felt himself ‘entdeutscht, innerlich entwürdigt und ganz resigniert’ (5 April 1934). With the rise of Hitler he’d had ‘his Germanness taken away, he was inwardly degraded and completely resigned.’ As these terrific minds fell to different fates, the new philosophy in the making, much of it now written in flight and in exile, was poised to change the twentieth century once it recovered from war.

Intellectually the philosophers had to make up their minds with regard to Germany’s great Enlightenment inheritance. It was specifically the German Aufklärung they addressed, which Cassirer had newly defined. The Aufklärung meant two hundred years of progress in European thought in which the individualism of the Renaissance came to coexist in productive tension with the rigour of the scientific spirit and a new historical conciousness. Through Leibniz and Kant this tension was finally resolved, Cassirer suggested, in a modern, progressive doctrine of individual freedom and dignity. This was  German Idealism in its classical (Kantian) form, and Cassirer saw it as a kind of philosophical maturing of Protestantism to serve a new spiritual secularism. The German Enlightenment, he rightly noted, had retained, within the scope its rational inquiry many of the psychological, moral and spiritual concerns that had once been the province of the church, and that made it less one-sided than the more mechanistic and materialistic versions of the Enlightenment that happened in France and England.

Cassirer and Husserl would retain their faith in this liberal European German spirit they believed offered a great universal example of what a modern civilization could be. They felt that the German mind was at its finest when it was European, in contrast to the primitive nationalism to which it had now regressed. Klemperer in his diaries was perhaps more pessimistic, wrapped up in his own fate, trying to stay alive while he watched a great culture disappear. But one feels all these men of the 1920s and 1930s were expressing something that Europe still struggles to hold on to today.

For Benjamin and Adorno,  German Jews of a younger generation, however, there was simply no chance of a return to the cultural past. Even as Benjamin was working out how to move on from Idealism, and considering what comfort he might find for himself in a specifically Jewish spirituality, he was on the run from the Nazis and killed himself rather than be captured on the Franco-Spanish border. Adorno and Horkheimer had prudently left for America six years earlier, and Columbia University was providing a home for the Frankfurt School of Social Research, even as, in 1940, the Klemperers were being ghetto-ized in Dresden. The direction in philosophy the Frankfurt School would stimulate would call itself critical theory, and much of the trauma of the era would feed into a postmodernism that undermined the persistent Europeanism of the old humanists.

It is an extraordinary story, to follow German philosophy at once at a theoretical level and at the same time on the level of everyday life in the Hitler years, and continuing postwar, and it’s the work I’m embarking on this year. In time I’ll be reading all the Klemperer diaries. Victor kept them almost until his death in 1960, aged 79. This is the first therefore of a several essays to come.

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